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 This paper assesses the effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and the larger United States homeland security enterprise in detecting and 
preventing terrorist attacks.  Has DHS been successful in its mission of counterterrorism? 
Has it prevented terrorist attacks? And is its focus appropriate for the nature of the 
terrorism threat today?   
 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established DHS, combining 22 separate federal 
departments and agencies in an attempt to coordinate the nation’s homeland security 
efforts. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the initial counterterror mission was to 
combat the threat that international terrorism, particularly al Qaeda, presented to the U.S. 
 
  This paper is based on an updated original data set that shows that DHS and other 
security agencies have effectively thwarted 230 terrorist attacks and violent plots in the 
U.S. since 9/11. By comparison, data from the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
as analyzed by the Washington Post show that, between 9/11 through the end of 2020, 
there have been a total of 81 terrorist attacks in the U.S. that caused fatalities to someone 
other than the attacker, killing a total of 276 people.2 DHS deserves a degree of credit for 
thwarting many attacks, but the bulk of the credit belongs to the larger U.S. national and 
homeland security enterprise that includes other federal government organizations such as 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Intelligence Community (IC), as well as 
state and local law enforcement organizations.3   
 
This paper’s data show that the terrorist threat has transformed in the past 20 years 
from what U.S. government officials perceived as a primarily international threat to a 
 
1 Associate Professor of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Email: 
ejdahl@nps.edu.   
2 Robert O'Harrow, A. B. T. (2021, April). “The rise of Domestic Extremism in America.” The Washington Post 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2021/domestic-terrorism-data/?itid=hp-top-
table-main. 
3 Department of Homeland Security. (2018, January). “Strengthening the homeland security enterprise.” 
https://www.dhs.gov/strengthening-homeland-security-enterprise. 
   
 
 
      2
largely domestic one. Yet, DHS has consistently suffered from a blind spot when it comes to 
domestic terrorism. Until very recently, DHS has continued to focus on international 
terrorism and failed to adapt its policies and efforts to meet the rising threat of white 
supremacy and other domestic terror threats from within its own borders.       
 
DHS’s responsibilities include such varied tasks as securing the country’s borders, 
enforcing immigration laws, safeguarding against cyber threats, and preparing for natural 
disasters. But counterterrorism is the job around which the department was created, and 
DHS leaders have consistently referred to it as the first among the department’s missions. 
The DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review in 2014, for example, stated that 
“Preventing terrorist attacks on the Nation is and should remain the cornerstone of 
homeland security,”4 and, more recently, DHS published a strategic plan that listed as its 
first goal to “counter terrorism and homeland security threats.”5     
 
This paper first examines definitions of terrorism and counterterrorism. Next, it 
proposes that we measure and assess the effectiveness of DHS’s counterterrorism efforts 
through an examination of how many plots and attacks have failed, and through what 
mechanisms. Then, the majority of the paper provides an overview of the data on which 
groups and individuals are committing, or attempting to commit, acts of terrorist violence 
in the U.S., their primary motives for such violence, and how U.S. law enforcement efforts 
have thwarted many plots and attempts at violence. Because many other agencies and 
organizations in the homeland security enterprise are also involved in counterterrorism, 
this assessment will also address those efforts to a certain degree, but will not attempt a 
comprehensive review of those other government programs. 
 
The paper concludes by arguing that the DHS’s slow response to the changing 
nature of the terrorist threat, and its lack of focus on domestic terrorism, helped create the 
environment that has produced numerous deadly attacks in recent years, including the 
assault on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021.     
 
Defining terrorism and counterterrorism   
 
Definitions are important, especially when they help establish the legal and policy 
boundaries within which government agencies act. Although there is no universal 
consensus on how to define terrorism, the Department of Homeland Security defines it as 
criminal, violent activity that appears intended to intimidate, coerce, or influence a civilian 
population or government policy, or to affect the conduct of government through 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.6 Other U.S. government definitions are similar, 
 
4United States Department of Homeland Security. (2014). “The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security 
Review.”  
5 United States Department of Homeland Security. (2019). “The DHS Strategic Plan.” 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0702_plcy_dhs-strategic-plan-fy20-24.pdf.  
6 6United States Department of Homeland Security. (2019). “Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism 
and Targeted Violence.”   
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but add the requirement that terrorism involves actions in support of ideological or 
political objectives. The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, for example, states that terrorism 
involves the unlawful use of force and violence “in furtherance of political or social 
objectives,”7 while the Department of Defense defines terrorism as “The unlawful use of 
violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological 
beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are 
usually political.”8      
 
Within that broad definition of terrorism, government agencies, scholars, and other 
terrorism experts offer a number of sub-categories that are often based on the motivations 
of the actors or the location of the violent acts. For example, terrorism may be described as 
international or domestic; and terrorists may be described as religious, rightwing, leftwing, 
or inspired by some other motivation.9 The many different terms used can make it difficult 
to assess U.S. government and DHS efforts to counter terrorism; for example, a conference 
sponsored by the National Counterterrorism Center in February 2020 that focused on the 
domestic terrorism (DT) threat found that “there is no whole-of-government DT threat 
picture, largely because the US Government does not have a common terminology to 
describe the threat.”10   
 
The Department of Homeland Security and the FBI have in recent years adopted a 
four-part framework for understanding terrorism and similar threats, which this paper will 
use.11   
 
• The first category is that of attacks carried out by or under the direction of 
foreign terrorist organizations (FTO), such as al Qaeda and ISIS.  This threat is 
also often referred to, from the U.S. perspective, as “international terrorism.”     
 
• Homegrown violent extremists (HVE), who operate primarily within the U.S. 
and who are inspired by foreign terrorist organizations but are not acting at 




terrorism-targeted-violence.pdf.;  DHS draws this definition from “Homeland Security Act of 2002” definition 
of terrorism, which is codified as 6 USC 101(18).   
7 28 CFR Section 0.85.   
8 Joint Publication 3-26. (2014, October). Counterterrorism. Note: other DoD publications offer similar, but 
slightly different definitions.   
9 For example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies divides terrorism into religious, 
ethnonationalist, violent far-right, violent far-left, and other; see: Seth Jones; Catrina Doxsee;. (2020, October 
22) “The War Comes Home: The Evolution of Domestic Terrorism in the United States.” Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/war-comes-home-evolution-domestic-terrorism-
united-states.   
10 National Counterterrorism Center. (2020 January). “Domestic Terrorism Conference Report,” 
https://www.dni.gov/files/2020-01-02-DT_Conference_Report.pdf. 
11 United States Department of Homeland Security. (2019). Strategic Framework.   
12 Although the FBI and DHS definitions do not point to any particular religion or ideology, to date all FTO and 
HVE attacks and plots have been inspired by some form of radical Islamism.   
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• Domestic terrorism (DT), which is a broad category that generally refers to 
terrorism that takes place primarily within the U.S. and is not inspired by a 
foreign terrorist group.  Domestic terrorism is divided into several sub-
categories, including what the DHS and FBI call racially and ethnically 
motivated violent extremists (REMVE), which encompasses white 
supremacists, other ethnically-based actors, and other categories involving 
the use or threat of force for the furtherance of ideological agendas related to 
anti-government, animal and environmental rights, or abortion-related 
extremism.13   
 
• Targeted violence, which includes attacks that do not have a clear motive or 
do not appear to have an ideological or political motive, and which for that 
reason are not considered terrorism.  Examples include many school 
shootings and the 2017 mass shooting in Las Vegas. 
 
Within the U.S. government, counterterrorism is typically seen as involving a 
proactive and offensive approach, while antiterrorism is seen as involving defensive 
measures.  This distinction is most commonly found within the Department of Defense, 
which defines counterterrorism as “activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists 
and their organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence 
to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals.”14  In practice this 
means DoD counterterrorism operations are primarily conducted overseas, often by 
special operations forces. The DoD defines antiterrorism, on the other hand, as “defensive 
measures used the reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts.”15  
Such actions could include the preparation of threat and vulnerability assessments, 
establishing security measures such as security cameras and barriers, and conducting 
training and exercises.   
 
DHS does not make such a distinction, and most often uses the terms 
counterterrorism or countering terrorism to describe efforts to combat the threat of 
terrorism. For example, it describes counter terrorism as requiring “a proactive approach ... 
to identify, detect, and prevent attacks against the U.S.”16  This paper follows DHS use of the 
term counterterrorism to refer to the wide range of actions taken by DHS and other 






13 FBI. (2020 November). “Domestic Terrorism: Definitions, Terrorism: Definitions, Terminology, and 
Methodology,” https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fbi-dhs-domestic-terrorism-definitions-terminology-
methodology.pdf/view.   
14 Joint Publication 3-26. (2014, October). Counterterrorism.   
15 Joint Publication 3-07.2. (2010, November).  Antiterrorism. 
16 Department of Homeland Security. (2021, February). “Counter Terrorism and Homeland Security Threats,” 
https://www.dhs.gov/counter-terrorism-and-homeland-security-threats.   
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Assessing counterterrorism effectiveness  
 
 Assessing the effectiveness of counterterrorism programs is difficult because it is a 
problem of small numbers—because the number of terrorist attacks in the U.S. is low, it is a 
difficult problem to analyze statistically.17 But only a few incidents can have outsized 
effects, and for that reason it is not enough to only consider the sheer number of terrorist 
attacks that occur, or the number of deaths. Instead, we must also look at near-misses, or 
failed attempts, as they can be strong indicators of continued threat.18 Counting negatives, 
terrorist attacks that do not happen, is of course difficult; and even if it is possible to count 
the number of unsuccessful attacks, it is difficult to determine how to define success. As 
stated by a recent study, “Does the system work if, every so often, a near-miss occurs? If 99 
out of 100 potential attacks are prevented?”19   
 
 Despite these difficulties, this paper recognizes that preventing attacks has been a 
key mission—perhaps the key mission— of the Department of Homeland Security. For that 
reason, the first measure of effectiveness used in this paper is the record of the department, 
and of the broader U.S. counterterrorism enterprise, in preventing terrorist attacks.20   
 
 Preventing attacks, however, cannot be the sole criteria used to determine success 
or failure. For example, if counterterrorism efforts were able to reduce attacks, but at the 
same time diverted attention and resources such that other threats were allowed to 
multiply, this could hardly be considered an overall success. Accordingly, this paper also 
looks more broadly at whether the department’s counterterrorism policy, strategy, and 
level of effort are appropriate for the terrorism threat faced in the U.S. today. As DHS 
prepares to face the terrorism threat of tomorrow, it is vital to determine whether it is 
focused appropriately today.   
 
Measuring DHS effectiveness in preventing violent attacks 
 
My study of failed terrorist plots indicates that there have been many more 
attempted and plotted attacks prevented in the U.S. since 9/11 than there have been deadly 
attacks successfully completed. In an earlier work, I identified a total of 109 unsuccessful 
attacks and plots against people in the U.S. during the years following 9/11 through 2012.21 
The vast majority of these attempts were prevented through the use of traditional law 
 
17 Daniel Benjamin. (2008, May 30). "What Statistics Don't Tell Us About Terrorism."  Brookings, 
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/what-statistics-dont-tell-us-about-terrorism/. 
18 Erik J. Dahl. (2011, August 1). “The Plots That Failed: Intelligence Lessons Learned from Unsuccessful 
Terrorist Attacks Against the United States,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34,  
https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.582628. 
19 Chappell Lawson; Alan Bersin. (2020). “Homeland Security Comes of Age,” Beyond 9/11: Homeland Security 
for the Twenty-First Century. 
20 This paper focuses on what might be called kinetic, or traditional terrorist attacks, because that is the 
primary terrorist threat upon which DHS was founded; it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine DHS’s 
performance in other important areas of counterterrorism such as cyber and biological terrorism.   
21 Erik Dahl. (2013). "Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and 
Beyond," Georgetown University Press. 
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enforcement tools, such as undercover operatives and tips from the public. This paper 
updates that data set, and shows a total of 230 unsuccessful attacks or plots against the U.S. 
through the end of 2020.22   
 
These more recent cases continue to show that plots and attacks are typically 
prevented through the use of traditional law enforcement methods.  In 2020, of the 16 
unsuccessful domestic terrorism attacks, 14 were prevented through action by law 
enforcement, most often with the FBI or the Joint Terrorism Task Force in the lead.23 Plots 
are often foiled by these organizations because members of the public report violent posts 
that individuals make online. This occurred when a man from Cleveland, Ohio was arrested 
in May 2020 for plotting to ambush law enforcement officers in order to start an uprising 
against the government. The FBI learned about him after he made several posts about his 
plans in an online chatroom.24 In a number of cases, the plotters attempt to carry out 
attacks using fake explosives provided to them by undercover officers or informants.  Such 
sting operations are often controversial and give rise to charges of entrapment, but federal 
courts have dismissed few terrorism cases on the grounds of entrapment.25 For example, in 
2017 an Oklahoma man was arrested after he tried to blow up a bank in Oklahoma City. But 
the bomb was inert, provided to him by the FBI, who had been monitoring him for months 
after an informant revealed Varnell’s desire to blow up a different building.26 Based on my 
careful examination of the circumstances of each case to assess whether the case involved a 
genuine attempt to commit a violent attack, my data set of thwarted attacks includes many 
such instances in which attackers were foiled by FBI sting operations.  
 
Of the 230 unsuccessful domestic terrorist attacks or plots since 9/11 that I have 
documented, 28 were directed by foreign terrorist organizations, 118 were committed by 
homegrown violent extremists, and 84 were committed by what the U.S. government terms 
domestic terrorists.  Figures 1, 2, and 3 (below) display this data, which I discuss further in 
the next section.   
 
These data suggest that the counterterrorism effort in the U.S. has been relatively 
effective in preventing terrorist violence. It may have prevented, or contributed to 
 
22 Data is available from the author, and is drawn from numerous sources including news accounts, law 
enforcement and court reporting, and studies by scholars and think tanks including CSIS, New America, and 
the Global Terrorism Database maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland.       
23 One plot failed as a result of the actions of the perpetrator: the would-be bomber was caught after his bomb 
exploded prematurely and blew off his hand.  Another attack was carried out against Naval Air Station Corpus 
Christi, Texas, but it failed when the attacker was shot and killed after he crashed his car into an entry barrier 
and fired shots that injured a guard.    
24 (2021, May 7). “Cleveland Man Found Guilty in Plot to Kidnap and Ambush Law Enforcement Officers,” 
WOIO, https://www.cleveland19.com/2021/05/07/cleveland-man-found-guilty-plot-kidnap-ambush-law-
enforcement-officers/.   
25 Eric Halliday and Rachel Hanna, “How the Federal Government Investigates and Prosecutes Domestic 
Terrorism,” Lawfare Blog, February 16, 2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-federal-government-investigates-
and-prosecutes-domestic-terrorism.   
26 Manny Fernandez. (2017, August 14). “Bombing Plot in Oklahoma City is Thwarted With Arrest, F.B.I. Says,” 
New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/us/oklahoma-van-bomb-domestic-terrorism.html.    
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preventing, the worst-case scenario that many government officials and outside experts 
warned about in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks: another attack on the scale of 9/11, or 
an even worse attack with a weapon of mass destruction such as a nuclear or biological 
weapon. However, it is important to note that despite the warnings that additional al Qaeda 
cells were waiting to carry out attacks, it appears that no such cells existed.27 Some experts 
have argued that there never was a real threat of another such major attack,28 while others 
see the lack of another 9/11 style attack as a success of U.S. counterterrorism on the home 
front.  Experts disagree on the role intelligence and military operations conducted overseas 
by the U.S. and its allies have played in reducing the terrorist threat.29 My data show that 
there have been attacks and plots by al Qaeda and ISIS within the U.S. since the 9/11 
attacks, and because of law enforcement efforts, the great majority of these plots have 
failed, with none coming close to the destructiveness of the 9/11 attacks.30   
 
Although some of the credit for these counterterrorism efforts goes to DHS and its 
many sub-organizations and agencies, most of these attempted plots were prevented by 
law enforcement, especially at the state and local levels, using the traditional tools of 
police.31 DHS itself, although created because of a terrorist act and with counterterrorism 
continuing to be seen as its primary mission, actually plays only a secondary role in U.S. 
counterterrorism.  It serves as a sort of umbrella agency for organizations with key 
counterterrorism roles, such as the Transportation Security Administration, Secret Service, 
and Customs and Border Protection. It also plays an important function in providing 
support and guidance to the 80 state and local intelligence fusion centers that have been 
established throughout the U.S. since 9/11.32   
 
While DHS is the lead federal agency for ensuring America’s domestic security, it is 
not actually in charge of American counterterrorism, nor does it have the lead on 
counterterrorism intelligence. The primary frontline counterterrorism effort in the U.S. is 
the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) system, led by the FBI, and the key counterterrorism 
intelligence organization in the U.S. government is the National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC), under the Director of National Intelligence, which has the lead on all terrorism 
 
27 Scott Shane. (2011, September 8). “Al Qaeda’s Outsize Shadow,” New York Times, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/us/sept-11-reckoning/qaeda.html. 
28 See John Mueller; Mark G. Stewart. (2010, April 2). “Hardly Existential: Thinking Rationally About 
Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-america/2010-04-02/hardly-
existential. 
29 International Crisis Group, Overkill: Reforming the Legal Basis for the U.S. War on Terror, September 17, 2021, 
pp. 23-24, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/005-us-counter-terrorism_1.pdf ; Daniel Byman, “Why There 
Hasn’t Been Another 9/11,” Wall Street Journal, September 11, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-
there-hasnt-been-another-9-11-11631332860.   
30 For an assessment of the current terror threat against the United States; See Bruce Hoffman; Jacob Ware. 
(2021, January). “Terrorism and Counterterrorism Challenges for the Biden Administration,” CTC Sentinel. 
31 Erik Dahl. (2020, February 24). “The Localization of Intelligence: A New Direction for American 
Federalism,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence,  
https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2020.1716563. 
32 See: Homeland Security. “Fusion Centers,” https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers.  Fusion centers have been 
controversial, with critics arguing they violate civil liberties and are an example of the militarization of 
policing.  I discuss these arguments in my article “The Localization of Intelligence,” cited above.   
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intelligence except for purely domestic terrorism.  For domestic terrorism intelligence, the 
FBI has the lead, not DHS. The DHS’s Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) office has long 
struggled to find its place in the huge U.S. intelligence community,33 and as stated by Stevan 
Bunnell in Beyond 9/11, “DHS does both a lot more and a lot less in the fight against 
terrorism than many people realize.”34   
 
Rising threat from domestic terrorism   
 
Despite the lack of another 9/11-scale attack, the U.S. has seen many smaller, but 
still deadly, attacks carried out in the past two decades. Nonetheless, in the 20 years since 
9/11, the nature of this violence has shifted.  Although the number of deaths from 
international terrorism has remained much lower than most experts would have expected, 
the number of attacks and deaths from other types of terrorism—most notably domestic 
terrorism—has been growing.   
 
The U.S. government first viewed the terror threat as emanating from attacks 
planned by al Qaeda itself, then shifted its focus to threats from al Qaeda affiliate 
organizations around the world, and then further shifted to viewing a broader Islamist 
terrorism threat, planned or guided by other organizations that the U.S. government 
categorizes as foreign terrorist organizations, including ISIS. A subsequent change in U.S. 
government perceptions of threat shifted to plots and attacks inspired but not directed by 
those foreign organizations—a threat which the FBI and DHS now term “homegrown 
violent extremism.”  And more recently, as the data in this paper indicates, the threat has 
increased from domestic terrorists who are motivated by a wide variety of causes and 
ideologies, including white supremacy and animosity toward government in general.     
 
This changing threat picture can be seen in the history of attacks and plots against 
the U.S. that have been either directly coordinated by foreign terrorist organizations (what 
DHS and the FBI call FTO threats), or inspired by such organizations (HVE threats).  Such 
attacks and plots are often referred to by terrorist experts as “jihadist” or “radical Islamist,” 
because to date all such attacks have claimed the mantle of some form of radical Islam.  A 
recent study by the New America think tank, for example, found that in the two decades 
since 9/11, a total of 107 people have been killed in the U.S. by attackers inspired by 
“jihadist” ideology.35   
 
33 Christian Beckner. (2021, May 25). “Reassessing Homeland Security Intelligence: A Review of the DHS 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis” Center for a New American Security,  
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/reassessing-homeland-security-intelligence. 
34 Stevan Bunnell. (2020). “Increasing Security While Protecting Privacy,” Beyond 9/11: Homeland Security for 
the Twenty-First Century. 
35 David Sterman; Peter Bergen; Melissa Salyk-Virk.; (2020, September). “Terrorism in America 19 Years After 
9/11.” New America, 
https://d1y8sb8igg2f8e.cloudfront.net/documents/Terrorism_in_America_19_Years_After_9_11_N6yekZJ.pdf
. Note that “jihadist” terrorism is typically defined as involving individuals using radical Islam or Islamism as 
justification for their acts, while “far right” or “rightwing” terrorism is generally considered a broad category 
that can include racial or ethnic hatred, or opposition to government authority.  Because these terms are 
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This type of threat remains, as illustrated by the December 2019 shooting at Naval 
Air Station Pensacola, Florida, in which a Saudi Arabian Air Force officer who was 
coordinating with al Qaeda killed three sailors. But it is significant that this was the only 
case since 9/11 in which a foreign terrorist organization has directed or provided 
operational advice for a deadly attack on U.S. soil. U.S. law enforcement efforts have 
thwarted a number of other attacks against the U.S. directly planned or coordinated by 
FTOs since 9/11. Examples include two plots foiled in 2015: one by a naturalized American 
citizen from Ohio who had trained with a terrorist group in Syria and who planned to 
kidnap and execute U.S. soldiers, only to be arrested following a routine traffic stop,36 and a 
Maryland man who accepted money from ISIS to carry out an attack within the U.S., but 
was arrested following an FBI investigation that tracked his finances and online 
communications.37  My own research shows there have been 28 such failed plots in the 
years since the 9/11 attacks, with the number of attempted attacks declining dramatically 
after a surge in the years immediately following 9/11.  Figure 1 shows the trend line of 
these “FTO” failed plots.    
 






imprecise and often controversial, this report focuses instead on the terminology and definitions used by DHS 
and FBI.   
36 Alissa Widman Neese. (2018, January 22). “Columbus Man Sentenced to 22 Years in Terror Plot,” The 
Columbus Dispatch, https://www.dispatch.com/news/20180122/columbus-man-sentenced-to-22-years-in-
terror-plot.  
37 Eric Lichtblau. (2015, December 14). “Maryland Man Accused of Tapping Money From ISIS Operatives for a 
U.S. Attack,” New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/us/politics/maryland-man-accused-
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Although almost all attacks since 9/11 directed by foreign terrorist organizations 
have been unsuccessful, attacks conducted by what the government calls homegrown 
violent extremists, have been more deadly. The year 2009 might be considered the high-
water mark for this kind of terrorism in the U.S., with a number of significant HVE attacks 
and plots, including at Fort Hood, Texas.38 Experts outside government and former 
government officials recognized that the nature of the threat was changing. They saw Al 
Qaeda and its affiliates as less likely to be able to carry out large-scale attacks, in part 
because of the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011. Former CIA Director Michael Hayden, for 
example, wrote in October 2010 about the changing al Qaeda threat from large, centrally 
planned attacks to smaller plots “homegrown” within the U.S. that were inspired and 
encouraged but not directed by al Qaeda.39  
 
The government has continued to view the HVE threat as high in recent years. 
However, local and federal law enforcement efforts have rendered the great majority of 
these plots and attacks unsuccessful. Often these cases involve either undercover law 
enforcement officers or informants, such was the case in 2020, when a Tampa, Florida, man 
who wanted to carry out a mass shooting on behalf of ISIS was arrested after trying to buy 
weapons through an FBI informant.40  My research shows there have been 118 failed HVE 
attacks from 9/11 through 2020, as shown in Figure 2.   
 




38 Peter Bergen; Bruce Hoffman; Katherine Tiedemann. (2011, January 24). “Assessing the Jihadist Terrorist 
Threat to America and American Interests,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.538830. 
39 Michael V. Hayden. (2010, October 21). “Are we ready for new form of terror?” CNN CNN.com,  
http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/10/21/hayden.security.terrorism/index.html?iref=allsearch.   
40 Jack Evans. (2020, May 27) “Tampa Supporter of Islamic State Terror Group Nabbed in Undercover Sting, 
FBI Says,” Tampa Bay Times, https://www.tampabay.com/news/crime/2020/05/27/tampa-supporter-of-












Failed attacks by homegrown violent extremists 
since 9/11
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While the FTO threat has been relatively low, and the HVE threat has been high but 
has largely resulted in failed plots and attacks, the threat from domestic terrorism has 
grown. As noted above, “domestic terrorism” refers to attacks and plots that take place 
primarily within the U.S., and are neither directed nor inspired by foreign terrorist 
organizations. This is a broad category that includes white supremacists, anti-government 
and militia groups, anti-Semitic groups and individuals, and those inspired by other beliefs 
and ideologies. Although most of these plots and attacks are often categorized by terrorism 
experts as “right-wing,” there have been several serious acts of domestic terrorism 
perpetrated by far-left extremists in recent years, such as the killing of a pro-Trump 
demonstrator in Portland in August 2020, and the 2017 shooting at a baseball practice held 
by Republican members of Congress. The DT threat includes what might be considered left-
wing threats such as anarchist, anti-fascist, and animal or environmental rights extremism. 
Of the 84 failed DT plots since 9/11, all but three can be categorized as far-right wing. In 
one case the motivation for the plan was unclear,41 while two cases stemmed from far-left 
wing ideologies or beliefs.42     
 
Terrorism experts outside of government have been warning for some time of this 
growing domestic terrorist threat. A 2017 study sponsored by the Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy  argued the threat was increasing, both from homegrown jihadist violence 
and from rightwing ideologies.43 In September 2019 Peter Bergen called the threat from 
jihadist terrorism “relatively limited,” but said that “white supremacist extremism is 
increasingly inspiring deadly violence” because the 9/11 attackers were inspired by 
jihadist ideology and had killed 104 people in the US, but those inspired by far-right 
ideology had killed 109.44 The ADL Center on Extremism has described a trend in 
increasingly lethal attacks by domestic extremists in recent years, and noted that rightwing 
extremists carried out all but one of the 17 domestic extremist attacks in 2019.45     
 
Other studies have also found that the threat from domestic terrorism has been 
growing—well before the January 6, 2021 assault on the Capitol that placed DT at the top 
of the American agenda.  A September 2019 report from the New America think tank found 
that 109 people had been killed since 9/11 by what they describe as far rightwing 
 
41 This was the case of a couple arrested in 2012 after authorities found bombmaking materials and a 
“terrorist encyclopedia” in their Greenwich Village, New York apartment.   
42 In July 2019 a self-proclaimed member of Antifa attempted to bomb a US Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement detention facility in Tacoma, Washington, but was killed by police.  In November 2014 two men 
were charged with plotting to bomb the St. Louis Gateway Arch and kill the police chief of Ferguson, Missouri, 
and a prosecutor, in response to the killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson.    
43 Policy Notes for the Trump Administration. (2017, March). “Defeating Ideologically Inspired Violent 
Extremism: A Strategy to Build Strong Communities and Protect the U.S. Homeland,” The Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-ideologically-
inspired-violent-extremism.  
44 Peter Bergen. “Global Terrorism: Threats to the Homeland, Part 1,” House Committee on Homeland Security. 
45 (2020, February).“Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2019” Center on Extremism, 
https://www.adl.org/murder-and-extremism-2019. 
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terrorists, compared with 104 who had been killed by what the report termed jihadist 
ideology.46 A report released in October 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies found that white supremacists and other domestic actors were responsible for 67 
percent of terrorist attacks and plots carried out up to that point in 2020.47   
 





The data show that the threat from domestic terrorists who are not inspired by 
foreign terrorist organizations has increased sharply in the past two years, with 12 
unsuccessful attacks and plots in 2019, and 13 in 2020—including such high-profile plots 
as the attempt to kidnap the governor of Michigan, and threats against other public figures 
such as the mayor of Wichita, Kansas, and New York Senator Chuck Schumer.   
 
All of these data indicate that the U.S. faces a number of terrorism threats, including 
continuing threats from foreign terrorist organizations and individuals inspired by such 
groups, and a growing threat from a wide array of domestic terrorists.  The U.S. is not alone 
in facing a wide variety of threats.  The head of the British domestic intelligence service 
MI5 recently stated the UK has disrupted 29 plots in the past four years, ten of which were 
from extreme right-wing terrorism.48   
 
46 Peter Bergen; David Sterman; Melissa Salyk-Virk. (2019). “Terrorism in America 18 Years After 9/11” New 
America, p. 25, https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/terrorism-america-18-years-
after-911/. 
47 Seth G. Jones. (2020, October). “The War Comes Home: The Evolution of Domestic Terrorism in the United 
States” Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/war-comes-home-
evolution-domestic-terrorism-united-states. 
48 Stephen Fidler. (2021, July 14). “U.K.’s MI5 Cites Growing Threats From Russia, China, Iran--and Right-Wing 
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By comparison, my data shows that the U.S. has seen 62 failed plots from 2017-
2020, including one directed by a foreign terrorist organization, 27 committed by 
homegrown violent extremists, and 35 cases of domestic terror.  Of those 35 DT cases, one 
was far left wing, while 34 were far right wing. The data is displayed in Figure 4.   
 




Assessing DHS’s counterterrorism focus     
 
The terrorist threat in the U.S. has transformed in the past 20 years from what 
officials perceived as a primarily international threat, dominated by al Qaeda and affiliated 
groups, to a now largely domestic one. While many violent attacks in the years after 9/11 
were largely inspired by what DHS would categorize as international terrorism or 
homegrown violent extremism, today this type of violence is more amorphous, involving 
individuals inspired by a wide variety of ideologies and beliefs including racial and other 
hatreds.  And yet DHS and other federal agencies—with the exception of the FBI—have 
been slow to recognize and address the domestic threat, and until only very recently have 
continued to focus primarily on international terrorism.       
 
Ever since it was created, DHS has focused on past threats, much like a general 
preparing to fight the last war. A focus on international terrorism was certainly 
appropriate in its first years, when memories of 9/11 were fresh and when terrorism 
experts generally understood the primary terrorist threat against the U.S. continued to be 
from al Qaeda. But DHS was slow to adapt its assessments to meet the changing nature of 
the threat. For example, in 2014 the DHS’s Quadrennial Homeland Security Review stated 
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review acknowledged the threat was increasing from lone offenders motivated by al Qaeda 
or inspired by other religious, political, or ideological beliefs.49     
 
This focus on international terrorism has continued to dominate the department’s 
counterterrorism efforts until only very recently, despite the evidence that has shown the 
rising threat from domestic terrorism.  In 2017, acting DHS Secretary Elaine Duke said that 
the threat was rising from domestic terrorism, but she nonetheless testified that “The 
primary international terror threat facing the U.S. is from violent global jihadist groups, 
who try to radicalize potential operatives within our homeland and seek to send operatives 
to our country.”50   
 
This international focus has been reflected not only in the language used by DHS 
leaders, but also in a wide range of policies and actions, perhaps most significantly in the 
effort to expand DHS presence overseas. These efforts are intended to better protect 
Americans at home by extending security outward, but they are not focused on addressing 
the domestic terrorism threat. Examples include stationing Customs and Border Protection 
officers at major airports around the world, and at U.S. embassies and consulates where 
they serve as attaches and advisors. DHS offices work closely with other government 
agencies that have traditionally externally-focused missions, such as the State Department 
and Department of Defense, and with foreign intelligence and law enforcement 
counterparts.  A senior DHS official explained the effort this way: “We can no longer view 
our border as the first line of defense, but rather as a last line of defense.”51  This effort has 
given DHS the third largest overseas footprint of any civilian U.S. agency, behind only the 
State Department and the CIA.52       
 
Individual DHS analysts and officials have understood the rising domestic threat, 
and have warned about what in the past has been described as rightwing extremism, a 
category that includes white supremacists, members of anti-government militia groups, 
and others motivated by a variety of issues including racial hatred and anger at gun control 
legislation. But DHS leaders have been reticent about the subject of domestic terrorism 
because of fears of a political backlash. When DHS published a report about the rightwing 
terrorism threat in 2009 that warned returning veterans that they might be targeted for 
recruitment by domestic extremists, it faced a firestorm of criticism from conservative 
groups and was forced to rescind the report.53   
 
 
49 “The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review,” 18. 
50 Elaine C. Duke. (2017, September 27). “Threats to the Homeland,” Testimony before the Senate Committee 
on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-
Duke-2017-09-27.pdf.     
51 John Wagner. (2015, June 2). “Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee 
on Border and Maritime Security, The Outer Ring of Border Security: DHS’s International Security Programs. 
52 Chappell Lawson; Alan Bersin. (2020). “The Future of Homeland Security,” Beyond 9/11: Homeland Security 
for the Twenty-First Century. 
53 Daryl Johnson. (2017, August 21) “I warned of right-wing violence in 2009. Republicans objected. I was 
right,” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/21/i-
warned-of-right-wing-violence-in-2009-it-caused-an-uproar-i-was-right/.    
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 Although DHS issued its first strategy document identifying domestic terrorism as a 
major threat in 2019, the primary focus has remained on international terrorism. For 
example, when the then-chief of DHS intelligence testified before the Senate on “threats to 
the homeland” in November 2019, he began his testimony by discussing international 
terrorism, including “the threat posed by Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), which 
remain a core priority of DHS’s counterterrorism efforts.”54   
 
The continued focus at DHS on the threat of international terrorism reflects a larger 
tendency among U.S. government intelligence and counterterrorism agencies for 
assessments and emphasis to lag behind the evidence of a change in the nature of the 
threat. For example, in January 2012, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper began 
his annual threat testimony by discussing the continued threat from al Qaeda and like-
minded groups, although he did describe core al Qaeda as in decline.  He discussed the 
homegrown violent extremist threat, but described it as characterized by lone actors or 
small groups without the capability to conduct sophisticated attacks.55 More recently the 
U.S. government’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism, published in October 2018, 
stated that “Radical Islamist terrorists remain the primary transnational terrorist threat to 
the U.S. and its vital national interests,” and devoted three pages to that threat, adding only 
two paragraphs on the domestic terror threat.56  The 2019 National Intelligence Strategy 
made no mention of domestic terrorism at all.57  And still today, the last publicly released 
National Intelligence Estimate on the domestic terrorism threat, issued in 2007, assessed 
that “Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland.”58  
 
The tendency within the federal government to downplay the domestic terror 
threat, and especially the threat from white supremacists, is a phenomenon also seen 
within U.S. law enforcement more generally.59  Critics argue that American law 
enforcement—where most officers are white—has a “blind spot” toward white supremacy 
and other aspects of far-right violence, where the perpetrators tend to be overwhelmingly 
white.60   
 
54 David Glawe. (2019, November 5). “Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs," Threats to the Homeland. 
55 James Clapper. (2012, January 31)., January 31, 2012 US Intelligence Community Worldwide Threat 
Assessment.   
56 (2018, October). “National Strategy for Counterterrorism” Washington, DC: The White House. 
57 (2019, January). “National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America” Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/item/1943-2019-
national-intelligence-strategy.  
58 (2007, July). “The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland,” National Intelligence Estimate. 
59 Janet Reitman. (2018, November 3). “U.S. Law Enforcement Failed to See the Threat of White Nationalism. 
Now They Don’t Know How to Stop It,” New York Times Magazine, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/magazine/FBI-charlottesville-white-nationalism-far-right.html.   
60 Adam Malka. (2019, August 12). “Why Law Enforcement Has a Blind Spot for White Male Violence,” 
Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/08/12/why-law-enforcement-has-blind-
spot-white-male-violence/. See also Michael German. (2020, August 27). “Hidden in Plain Sight: Racism, 
White Supremacy, and Far-Right Militancy in Law Enforcement” The Brennan Center, 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/hidden-plain-sight-racism-white-supremacy-
and-far-right-militancy-law. 
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The FBI has, however, been an exception to the general lack of focus on domestic 
terrorism. As we have seen above, the FBI has the lead among federal government agencies 
on domestic terrorism-related intelligence, and its Joint Terrorism Task Forces have been 
the most important operational entity in combating terrorism within the homeland, so the 
bureau’s focus on the domestic threat is not surprising. Its leaders have often warned about 
domestic terrorism, both from individuals inspired by global jihad who are radicalized 
primarily in the U.S., and from right-wing extremists, including white supremacists. For 
example, two senior FBI officials testified in June 2019 about the threat posed by domestic 
terrorists and hate crimes.61 In February 2020, FBI Director Christopher Wray testified that 
“More deaths were caused by domestic violent extremists than international terrorists in 
recent years.”62  Another organization that has focused on domestic attacks is the Secret 
Service—a part of DHS, but one with a very specialized mission of protecting the president 
and other senior leaders. Beginning in 2017, the Secret Service has published a very useful 
series of annual reports on Mass Attacks in Public Spaces.63    
 
In the past several years, DHS has in fact begun to put more focus on domestic 
terrorism, including violent white supremacists.64 But these efforts were largely blocked by 
the Trump administration. For example, a study by the Atlantic Council noted that the 
department had difficulty getting resources and support for combating white supremacy.65  
DHS’s focus on domestic extremism has also been derailed by pressure from senior officials 
to emphasize instead other concerns including immigration and border security.66   
 
Several senior DHS officials who encouraged a focus on domestic terrorism, 
including white supremacy, either left the department or were fired. Kevin McAleenan, 
who, as the acting secretary of homeland security beginning in April 2019, pushed to 
broaden the department’s focus to include white supremacy, resigned in November 2019.67  
In February 2020, Elizabeth Neumann, then the Assistant Secretary for Threat Prevention 
and Security Policy at DHS, testified before a House committee hearing on anti-Semitic and 
white supremacist terrorism that “every counterterrorism professional I speak to in the 
federal government and overseas feels like we are at the doorstep of another 9/11, maybe 
 
61 Michael McCarrity; Calvin Shivers. (2019, June 4). “Confronting White Supremacy,” Statement for the Record 
before the House Oversight and Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/confronting-white-supremacy   
62 Christopher Wray. (2020, February 5). “Statement Before the House Judiciary Committee” Washington D.C., 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/fbi-oversight-020520. 
63 United States Secret Service. https://www.secretservice.gov/protection/ntac/.     
64 Department of Homeland Security. https://www.dhs.gov/blog/2017/08/16/did-you-know-four-ways-
dhs-working-prevent-terrorism-home.    
65 Thomas Warrick; Caitlin Durkovich. (2020 September). “Future of DHS Project: Key Findings and 
Recommendations” Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/future-of-dhs/future-
of-dhs-project-final-report/. 
66 Betsy Woodruff Swan. (2020, August 26) “They tried to get Trump to care about right-wing terrorism. He 
ignored them,” Politico,  https://www.politico.com/news/2020/08/26/trump-domestic-extemism-
homeland-security-401926.   
67 Alex Kingsbury. (2019, September 23). “Rethinking Counterterrorism,” New York Times, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/23/opinion/dhs-domestic-terrorism.html?searchResultPosition=7. 
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not something that catastrophic in terms of the visual or the numbers, but that we can see 
it building and we don’t quite know how to stop it.”68  But Neumann left DHS in April 2020, 
and later complained that the department had not done enough to focus on domestic 
extremism, including anti-Semitic hate crimes, white supremacy, and other right-wing 
violence.69     
 
In September 2020, the former head of DHS’s intelligence organization filed a 
whistle-blower complaint alleging that top DHS leaders had ordered intelligence 
assessments to be modified to make the white supremacist threat “appear less severe” and 
to include more information on left-wing violence.70  Reportedly, a draft DHS assessment 
identified white supremacists as the most serious terror threat facing the U.S., but the 
report’s release was delayed, and the language about white supremacy was softened in 
later drafts.71 When the report was finally released in October 2020, however, it did not 
appear to be watered down, and in a forward to the report, then-acting DHS Secretary Chad 
Wolf wrote that “I am particularly concerned about white supremacist violent extremists 
who have been exceptionally lethal in their abhorrent, targeted attacks in recent years.”72   
 
The most striking demonstration of the rise of the domestic terrorism threat—and 
the lack of focus on that threat—was the January 6, 2021, assault on the U.S. Capitol.  There 
is a debate over how January 6 should be defined: was it an attempted coup,73 an 
insurrection,74 sedition,75 or something else?  But the events of January 6 clearly meet 
DHS’s definition of terrorism, which, as noted above, includes actions intended to affect the 
conduct of government through destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. FBI Director 
 
68 Bridget Johnson. (2020, March 1). “Extremism Building to the ‘Doorstep of Another 9/11,’ DHS Official Tells 
Anti-Semitism Hearing,” Homeland Security Today,  https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-
areas/infrastructure-security/extremism-building-to-the-doorstep-of-another-9-11-dhs-official-tells-anti-
semitism-hearing/.   
69 Betsy Woodruff Swan. (2020, August 26). “They Tried to Get Trump to Care about Right-Wing Terrorism. 
He Ignored Them.,” Politico, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/08/26/trump-domestic-extemism-
homeland-security-401926; Zolan Kanno-Youngs. (2020, September 1). “Trump Administration Promise to 
Focus on Extremism Remains Unfulfilled,” New York Times,  
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/01/us/politics/trump-homeland-security-
extremism.html?searchResultPosition=1.  
70 Zolan Kanno-Youngs and Nicholas Fandos. (2020, September 9). “D.H.S. Downplayed Threats from Russia 
and White Supremacists, Whistle-Blower Says,” New York Times, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/09/us/politics/homeland-security-russia-
trump.html?action=click&module=Well&pgtype=Homepage&section=Politics.   
71 Betsy Woodruff Swan. (2020, September 4). “DHS draft document: White supremacists are greatest terror 
threat,” Politico, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/04/white-supremacists-terror-threat-dhs-
409236.    
72 Department of Homeland Security. (2020) Homeland Threat Assessment.   
73 Dana Milbank. (2021, July 15). “This historian predicted Jan. 6. Now he warns of greater violence,” 
Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/07/15/american-democracy-survived-
its-reichstag-fire-jan-6-threat-has-not-subsided/.   
74 Aaron Blake. (2021, July 13). “Yes, it was an insurrection,” Washington Post, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/07/13/yes-it-was-an-insurrection/.   
75 Jonathan Tepperman. (2021, January 6). “Why This Wasn’t a Coup,” ForeignPolicy.com, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/06/why-this-wasnt-a-coup-capitol-2020-election-trump/.   
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Christopher Wray testified to Congress “that siege was criminal behavior, plain and simple, 
and it’s behavior that we, the F.B.I., view as domestic terrorism.”76  Terrorism experts such 
as Bruce Hoffman have also labelled it as domestic terrorism.77   
 
Another debate about January 6 concerns whether or not the assault resulted from a 
failure of intelligence. A number of experts and leaders have called it an intelligence failure, 
including former Capitol Police chief Steven A. Sund, who said that the “entire intelligence 
community seems to have missed” warning signs.78  Others, however, have argued that 
because multiple agencies (including DHS) had produced warnings about violent 
extremism in general and about the January 6 demonstration in particular, no intelligence 
failure existed.79   
 
DHS’s intelligence office published an assessment on December 30, 2020, that 
warned white supremacists could carry out “mass casualty” attacks, but it did not warn 
about an attack on the Capitol.80  A Senate staff report noted that “DHS I&A never produced 
an intelligence product, bulletin, or warning specific to the January 6 Joint Session of 
Congress,”81 and on January 5 a national summary report from I&A stated “Nothing 
significant to report.”82 As Mitchell D. Silber has written, the intelligence failure of January 
6 appears to be mostly one of analysis, and not collection, as there were plenty of warnings 
available that large numbers of potentially violent extremists would be gathering at the 
Capitol, but there was little analysis and assessment as to what this meant.83 The lack of 
analysis and understanding of the threat on the part of DHS and many other agencies 
suggests strongly that they did not understand the growing threat posed by domestic 
extremism. No matter what term we use to define January 6, it seems clear that, as 
 
76 Adam Goldman. (2021, March 7). “New Report Warns of Rising Threat of Domestic Terrorism,” New York 
Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/17/us/politics/domestic-
terrorism.html?searchResultPosition=1.   
77 Bruce Hoffman. (2021, January 7). “Domestic Terrorism Strikes U.S. Capitol, and Democracy,” Council on 
Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/domestic-terrorism-strikes-us-capitol-and-democracy.   
78 Mark Mazzetti; Adam Goldman. (2021, February 5). “Muddled Intelligence Hampered Response to Capitol 
Riot,” New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/05/us/politics/capitol-riot-domestic-
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80 Adam Goldman; Katie Benner; Zolan Kanno-Youngs,. (2021, January 30). “How Trump’s Focus on Antifa 
Distracted Attention From the Far-Right Threat,” New York Times, 
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terrorism.html?searchResultPosition=1.   
81 U.S. Senate Staff Report. “Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of the Security, Planning, and 
Response Failures on January 6,” 
https://www.rules.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Jan%206%20HSGAC%20Rules%20Report.pdf. 
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terrorism expert Martha Crenshaw has written, “Our preoccupation since the Sept.11 
attacks with the Islamist and jihadist threat may have blinded us to the fact that terrorism 




 Today, the evidence shows that the direct threat posed by international terrorist 
groups against the U.S. has significantly receded. However, since the 9/11 attacks, DHS has 
consistently failed to adapt to the changing nature of the terrorist threat. In particular, it 
failed to properly address the rising threat of domestic terrorism until it was too late to 
help prevent the assault on the Capitol by a mob emboldened by years of neglect toward 
white supremacist and other forms of domestic terror. Part of the blame for this lack of 
focus lies with the Trump administration and its insistence on focusing on other threats, 
such as the southern border, and its unwillingness to acknowledge the rising threat of 
domestic terror. But DHS lagged behind in its assessment of the terrorist threat well before 
Trump took office; the failure to recognize and respond effectively to the changing terrorist 
threat preceded the Trump administration, and the reasons for the failure extend beyond 
any one president.   
 
The fundamental problem may lie in the inability of large government bureaucracies 
to adjust and adapt to changing threats and challenges.  As Amy Zegart noted, this problem 
was one of the basic causes for the intelligence failure that led to the 9/11 attacks.85 Nearly 
20 years after those terrorist attacks shocked America and the world, the events of January 
6, 2021 again shook Americans’ sense of security and forced a reexamination of where the 
focus should be in counterterrorism. More recent efforts by DHS under the Biden 
administration are promising, such as the issuance of bulletins warning of the continuing 
threat from what it called domestic violent extremists,86 and a joint report with the FBI 
providing a strategic intelligence assessment on domestic terrorism.87  The White House 
ordered the Director of National Intelligence to review the domestic terrorism threat in 
coordination with the DHS and FBI,88 and it produced a new National Strategy for 
Countering Domestic Terrorism.89  DHS has made other positive steps, such as appointing 
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John Cohen, a well-respected official, as the interim chief of I&A, and establishing a new 
domestic terrorism unit within its intelligence office.90  This increased focus was long 
overdue, but the question going forward will be: is this new emphasis on domestic 
terrorism sufficient?  And when the nature of the threat changes again, will DHS and other 
agencies be able to adapt, or will they again lag behind in their assessments of the threat?   
 
We might also ask: in the face of these continuing problems, and in recognition that 
even in the job of counterterrorism DHS tends to play a secondary role behind 
organizations such as the FBI and the National Counterterrorism Center, is the Department 
of Homeland Security even necessary? Critics have called for DHS to be reorganized or 
disbanded ever since its founding.91  But as the problem of domestic terrorism increases, it 
will continue to be necessary for DHS to coordinate the actions of agencies such as the 
Transportation Security Administration, Customs and Border Protection,  and the Secret 
Service.  And DHS’s own intelligence organization, although struggling to find its identity 
among the larger agencies of the U.S. intelligence community, still serves an important 
function in coordinating with and supporting state local intelligence and counterterrorism 
efforts.   
 
It is also important to remember that countering terrorism is only one of DHS’s 
many missions.  For example, although DHS does not have the lead role combating 
infectious disease, it does have a number of very important responsibilities concerning 
health security, including coordinating the whole of government pandemic response 
through the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The wide variety of threats and 
challenges facing the U.S. in the present suggests that DHS is more important today than 
ever, although it should consider refocusing its missions around threats such as pandemics, 
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